THE RETURN OF THE WTO: Why the 9th Ministerial and the Bali package threaten the people and the planet

THE RETURN OF THE WTO: Why the 9th Ministerial and the Bali package threaten the people and the planet
By Mary Louise Malig*
Social Movements for an Alternative Asia

After numerous stalled negotiations, many had written off the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the walking dead. Pascal Lamy, its Director General, the former hard hitting lead negotiator for the European Union, was forced to concede that the WTO was at an impasse last December 2011 when the Ministerial was called a “housekeeping exercise.” It is therefore no surprise that there was not a lot of attention for the upcoming 9th Ministerial in Bali, Indonesia. However, as this paper will explain further, this is no time to be complacent. This Bali Ministerial will be different from the previous boring, “housekeeping” Ministerials. It carries with it a real danger and threat of not only the return of the WTO, but an expansion of its reach and the launching of new negotiations into new areas.
The Bali Package presents itself as a concession to developing countries, offering to meet demands on food security and tariff concerns on agriculture and addressing the long-standing special and differential treatment issues of Least Developed Countries. But with this comes a poison, a deal on trade facilitation, a previously rejected “new issue”, which now, not only threatens to drastically open markets by relaxing trade customs barriers, it carries the threat of the expansion of the WTO, continuing to extend its reach to areas beyond trade. The Bali Package, if agreed, will mean more obligations for poor countries and will inject new life into the stalled multilateral trade talks, it will revive and expand the WTO and through a domino effect, will also expand the areas of negotiation in the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) such as in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). After all, the WTO is still the basis for all FTAs and it is still the only multilateral organization with the power to force sovereign states into compliance through its all-powerful Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
Furthermore, several factors – the changed political landscape with its new key players, the new economic reality and a new approach to moving the negotiations forward- have come together for not only the possible return of the WTO, but with the Bali Package, the revival and expansion of the Free Trade Regime as a whole.
The Real Threat of the Bali Package
In reality, more than the contents of the package, the threat of the Bali Package is that it revives the negotiations and opens the door to not only further negotiations, but also the expansion of the WTO itself. Trade Facilitation was a “new issue” that was rejected long ago by developing countries and yet it’s back on the table as the centerpiece of the Bali Package. Agreement on this issue, opens the door to the other “new issues”, which expand the WTO coverage, that were also rejected a number of years ago and revitalizes the free trade negotiations itself, taking it out of its current impasse.
Who Wants to Revive the Negotiations?
The WTO Doha Round negotiations have been in stalemate for many years. The dead lock of the Doha Round led to the stalemate of the WTO negotiations. Now in Bali they are going to try to agree some elements of the Doha Round then move on to new negotiations into other areas. Several factors can be attributed to why they want to revive the negotiations but the main ones are:
– First, that the WTO is still the only multilateral trading organization that has the special ability to legally enforce and penalize countries and in several cases, change their national laws in order to implement the WTO rules on free trade.
– Second, the system of capitalism is based on continuous growth and expansion and without this, there is a decline in profit. So for the system to increase their rate in profit, they need to keep expanding and growing – hence the need to expand the multilateral trading system into new areas. Transnational corporations need this expansion and growth in order for their rate of profit to continue to grow. And in reality, it is these big transnational corporations who control majority of global trade, that are the beneficiaries of the WTO and its expansion into new areas for free trade. The green economy is a clear example of capitalism searching for new areas, in that case, treating nature as capital, in order to keep expanding, growing and maintaining their increase in profit.
– Third, developed countries who have been hardly hit by the 2008 financial crisis, have yet to fully recover and are seeing their economies stagnate and their growth slow down. They need access to the markets of the developing countries, especially the major emerging countries whose economies are growing, so that they can get out of the crisis.
– Fourth, the big developing countries themselves are beginning to feel the crunch. The currencies of the big economies in Asia like India and Indonesia are devaluating at alarming rates as they begin to feel the impacts of the crisis.
Also, in the analysis of the players of the WTO and the Free Trade regime, there needs to be a realization that global trade is not only between countries but even more so between transnational corporations. And on several occasions, countries move with the interests of their corporations in mind.
The Difficult Days of the Doha Development RoundA Round refers to the set of negotiations aimed at agreeing on a number of things. The Uruguay Round, for example, which lasted from 1986-1994, established the WTO and agreed the 60 agreements that are now in place under the WTO including among others, the Agreement on Agriculture.
Although officially born on January 1, 1995, the WTO only came under the spotlight in 1999 during the massive mobilizations in the streets of Seattle. The anti-globalization movement had come together in a brilliant show of strength and coordination and had combined with the discontent of developing countries to produce the first collapse of a WTO Ministerial. 2001, in the confines of the Qatari capital of Doha, blanketed by the global atmosphere of the war on terror, the WTO produced the Doha Development Round, which since then, it has been trying to move, with great difficulty, to conclusion.
The Doha Development Round, also known as the Doha Development Agenda, is the current center of negotiations in the WTO. It’s overall objective is to lower remaining trade barriers around the world, to facilitate greater and easier trade flows. It covers a whole range of issues from agriculture to services to special and differential treatment. It was dubbed the Development Round as it purportedly was about delivering “development” to the least developed and developing countries.
Although there were small movements and advances, the Doha Round as a whole, remained at an impasse. Aside from being too ambitious in areas of great contention such as agriculture and services, and pushing for an expansion of the WTO reach into “new issues” such as trade facilitation, government procurement, investment and competition, it also suffered from its own size, weighing itself down with its single undertaking rule, which meant everything was either agreed or nothing at all. The collapse of the 2003 Ministerial in Cancun was evidence of the difficulty in the negotiations. The Least Developed Countries had walked out of the negotiations, rejecting the “new issues” and stating that their demands for special and differential treatment and development were not being addressed. Cancun also witnessed the coming together of developing countries into groupings on agriculture such as the G20 led by Brazil and the G33 led by Indonesia. The Cancun collapse was also due to the great public pressure that had arisen from the self-immolation of Korean farmer Lee Kyung Hae, who died on the fence outside the Cancun Ministerial, wearing a sign that said “WTO Kills Farmers.”
The WTO managed to get itself back on track with a Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration in 2005 but with almost no legitimacy as government security forces tear-gassed and arrested hundreds of protesters outside the venue and with the Ministerial Chair gaveling down the declaration despite protests from some developing countries. After Hong Kong, there were several other attempts at forward movement, stalling in 2008, until finally in December 2011, ten years after the launch of the Doha Development Round, WTO Director General Pascal Lamy admitted what everyone had known for a while, that the WTO negotiations were at an impasse.   
The Real Reason for the Impasse in the Doha Round
Back in 1995, the WTO was created with the promise to supposedly bring discipline to the agriculture sector. The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was a groundbreaking deal because for the first time, there was a multilateral deal that covered the sector as a whole and the promise to the developing countries was that this deal would bring an end to the trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture of the US and the EU. However, through the various loopholes in the AoA, the US and the EU were able to increase instead of decrease, their subsidies, continuing the dumping of cheap agricultural goods, putting developing country farmers out of work. The Doha Development Round was an attempt to expand the negotiations of the WTO, with the illusion to bring disciplines to those subsidies and provide market access to developing country farmers such as cotton. The Hong Kong Declaration stated that 2013 would be the deadline for ending export subsidies and that there would be duty free quota free market access for the cotton farmers. And yet, still, nothing. This is the real reason for the impasse. Developed countries remain intransigent in their ways and yet expect more and more concessions from developing countries. Furthermore, the promise of disciplining the massive subsidies of the US and EU was never real, the true goal of the AoA was to gain access to agricultural markets of the developing countries while disciplining their governments and limiting their policy space.
The Changed Economic and Political Landscape
The global crisis that hit in 2008 changed the economic and political landscape. The centers of capitalism, the US and the EU, were the hardest hit and have yet to fully recover. Their growth slowed down significantly and their unemployment hit record highs. Realizing that that they needed the growing markets of the major emerging economies or the big developing countries to save them from financial and economic ruin, the US, EU and other developed countries convened the first G-20 heads of state meeting in November of 2008, effectively bringing the major emerging developing countries of Brazil, India, China, Indonesia, Argentina, and South Africa into the previously closed “big boys club” of the G-8.
Nearly parallel to this development was also the development of a new developing or newly-industrialized countries grouping of the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India and China, to be joined by South Africa in 2010. In other words, the world was changing and with it, the old power structures. As the crisis continues though, the major emerging economies, have also begun to feel the impacts, bringing currency devaluation and uncertainty in the markets which in turn translate into instability in the economy.
The G-20 solution to this crisis is to have more free trade by opening the door to the expansion of the WTO into new areas, and the opening of new markets with new FTAs such as the US-EU and the TPP. This, they are doing not only to save their economies from the crisis but also to secure the continuing rate of profit of their transnational corporations, the clear beneficiaries of the expansion of global free trade. The WTO itself recognizes this, as it details in its recent report, “Current trade is mainly driven by a few big trading firms across countries.”[i]
The changed power structures in the WTOIn the previous era of the WTO, there was a particular power structure amongst the States. The Quad was at the top of that structure and wielded all the power. The Quadrilateral group or The Quad – the powerful four – were the United States, the European Union, Canada and Japan. The US and the EU would meet and resolve any major differences between the two of them. And then they would call Canada and Japan, often with the participation of the WTO Secretariat, to further establish a common position. Then they would have a Mini-Ministerial, a non-official, by-invitation-only-meeting, where key developing countries were invited and asked to agree to the deal. By the time the rest of the WTO membership was presented the deal at a Ministerial, the negotiations were already a done deal.
The changing economic landscape however, also brought changes to the political landscape. There were now bigger developing countries that could not so easily be bullied into done deals – Brazil, India, Indonesia, to name a few – these were all large and fast growing economies that could not be ignored. New developing country formations also rejected the proposals of the US and the EU.
This new realpolitik is reflected in the new WTO. The new Director General is, in reality, a direct result of this new changed political landscape. Insiders have reported that the race for the new Director General was a close competition between the candidates of Mexico and Brazil, with Mexico enjoying the support of the US and the UK but with the EU standing on the fence and with the support of the BRICS, the developing countries, who make up the majority of the WTO membership, cast their vote for Roberto Azevedo of Brazil.
This means that the new WTO Director General Roberto Azevedo who started last September 1, 2013, has a lot of support and political capital that he can use to move the negotiations beyond its current impasse. This may also mean that key developing countries would now show more willingness to compromise and come to an agreement.
As a caveat though, it has never been simply developed versus developing as many, both developed and developing countries had and continue to have common interests for their corporations.
A Different Way to Move the WTO Negotiations
Not only is there a change in the economic and political landscape, but there is also a change in the way the negotiations are moving. The Bali Package is a way to agree some elements of the Doha Round but more importantly, it is a stepping-stone to launching new negotiations into other areas, leaving behind the deadweight of the Doha Round.
Moving in parallel to this, is also the plurilateral negotiations on other contentious areas such as services. Insider reports indicate that the new approach shall be to settle the major differences first through these plurilateral negotiations then later on, push for the deal to be become multilateral, applying to all, instead of only to those interested.
The Groups G simply means group and the number usually represents the number of countries that belong to that group. Countries come together into these groups on different topics, some with the purpose of having a stronger negotiating position and some with a more long-term political, financial and economic goal.
G-90 is the largest trading bloc in the WTO in terms on numbers, as it brings together poorest and smallest developing country members of the WTO. In it are the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP), the African Union and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs).
G-33 chaired by Indonesia, this developing country grouping, which includes India, the Philippines and several others, is mainly composed of developing countries with large populations of smallholder farmers and have been at the forefront of proposing special measures for developing countries in the area of agriculture.
G-20 chaired by Brazil, this group was formed shortly before the Cancun Ministerial in 2003. Established by Brazil, India, China and South Africa, this developing country bloc’s main positions are around gaining effective market access into developed country markets for their agricultural products and seeing an end to export subsidies of the developed countries.
The other G-20 differs from the other negotiating groups formed in the WTO because it was formed with a more long-term political, financial and economic goal. It brought together “systemically important” developed and developing countries to discuss key financial policy issues in the global economy. However, it has mandated itself with much more than just discussing global finance. It meets annually to decree political directions on the issues of food security, energy security, climate change, trade, jobs, poverty reduction and development. It designated itself to be the premier forum for international economic cooperation. There are serious questions on their legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of the rest of the world. It is essentially the G8 plus friends. The 20 members of this grouping are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and the European Union. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also participate in G-20 meetings although on an ex-officio basis.
The Dark Side of the Bali Package
There are three main elements of the Bali Package: Trade Facilitation, Agriculture and a Package for Least Developed Countries.
1) Trade Facilitation
At the heart of this Bali Package is a deal on Trade Facilitation. This is the centerpiece of the Package as it aims to facilitate easier, more predictable, faster and greater trade flows for corporations. To put simply, trade facilitation is the relaxing of customs procedures to cut the time it takes for goods to cross borders. This was part of the four “new issues” that were rejected in the 2003 Cancun Ministerial by developing countries and yet has found its way back on the table and in the center of a deal. This was always and remains to be a developed country demand as it is developed countries that have the most to gain in easier and faster access to markets of developing countries. Easing customs procedures though, will need a significant amount of funds, to implement in developing countries whose customs and border procedures are not up to the standards of developed countries. Developing countries do not have the money to invest in the standardization of customs and border procedures. They barely have enough money to address issues of hunger and poverty, and then they will be expected to spend for the modernization of border procedures just to comply with global trade rules. And although this will mean the relaxing of customs and border procedures as well of the developed countries, it can almost be predicted that many developing countries will not be able to take advantage of that to access developed country markets as evidenced by previous empty promises of market access and duty free quota free access by developed countries. Finally, the real threat of the Trade Facilitation deal is that its agreement will open the door for the other rejected “new issues” (government procurement, investment and competition) and the expansion of the WTO’s coverage into new areas not previously covered or dealt with in trade.
2) Agriculture
Agriculture has always been at the center of the impasse of the Doha Development Round. When negotiations finally stalemated in 2008, the sticking point was agriculture. Today, some of those long-standing issues in agriculture are back on the table together with demands from the developing countries. There are a number of elements in the Agriculture section of the Bali Package.
– public stockholding for food security and domestic food aid (G33)
– eliminating export subsidies/export competition (G20)
– disciplines of administering Tariff-Rate Quotas (G20)
The first element is a proposal tabled by the G33 and is centered on the demand for developing countries to be allowed to use price support to implement public stockholding for food security and domestic food aid. This means that G33 countries are asking that they be allowed to provide subsidies to poor farmers. For the proposal to work on a long-term basis though, the AoA needs to be amended, specifically its rules on domestic support. Under the current rules, countries like India and Indonesia cannot subsidize their poor farmers because they would go beyond the AoA domestic support limits. India, in particular, which has just signed into law last September 2013, the National Food Security Bill, aims to provide subsidized food grains to poor members of its population, which according to some estimates would be around two-thirds of India’s 1.2 billion population. If India implements this law, legal action can be taken against it under the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, as it will violate the AoA’s rules on domestic support. The G33, led by Indonesia, argues that they need this amendment to the rules in order to provide food security for their poor farmers and consumers.
Developed countries however found the proposal to amend the AoA as “too big an issue for Bali.”[ii]Instead, they offer interim mechanisms including time-based or threshold-based flexibilities so as to allow the subsidies but without the threat of legal challenges under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Insider reports had indicated that the G33 proposal was first outright rejected but because of India’s threat to derail the trade facilitation deal in return, the developed countries have come back with these interim solutions. The proposed interim solutions, aside from having no assurance of really working, also fall far from what the G33 countries demand.
Why the Agreement on Agriculture needs to be amended for the G33 proposal to workUnder the rules of the AoA, domestic support, which includes measures to support prices, administered prices or subsidies directly related to production quantities, fall under the Amber box and are subject to limits. The limits are 5% of agricultural production for developed countries and 10% of agricultural production for developing countries. At the beginning of the WTO, WTO members that had subsidies higher than these “de minimis” levels were required to commit to reduce. These reductions are referred to as the Total Aggregate Measurement of Support. The formula for calculating Total AMS is:
Volume of eligible production     x     Difference between the external reference price  (world market price) and the administered price   =   Value of farm subsidy provided
Following this understanding of the AoA, one can understand why these four elements below are the ones listed as the main elements that need to be negotiated in order for the G33 countries to be able to provide subsidies without exceeding the limits or facing legal challenges under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. One of these four rules of the AoA need to be amended for the G33 proposal to work:
1) Raise the “de minimis” support ceiling for developing countries from 10% to 15%
2) Review the 1986-88 external reference prices and use instead a more current reference price year
3) Review the volume of eligible production
4) Negotiate the administered price but the G33 is not open to reducing further this fourth variable as this is the support that they want to give to their farmers.[iii]
The second element is a proposal tabled by the G20 grouping on agriculture, led by Brazil. This proposal calls for an end to export subsidies and disciplining export credits to avoid that the credit is then subsidized. This proposal stems from a long-standing issue. In 2005, at the end of the 6th WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong, the declaration stated, “6. We agree to ensure the parallel elimination of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect to be completed by the end of 2013.[iv] 2013 is now halfway over and yet the EU and US are nowhere near eliminating their export subsidies. And despite the fact that this proposal is already an agreement from a previous Ministerial Declaration, there is still opposition to it coming from the largest subsidizers.
The third element is a proposal also by the G20, centered on the demand of the G20 to have tighter disciplines on administering tariff-rate quotas (TRQs). In essence, this proposes easing farm imports under tariff rate quotas as current rules impede effective market access by developing countries into developed country markets. This is reportedly seen as a proposal that can be agreed in Bali despite some reservations on how the mechanism would work in practice.
3) Package for Least Developed Countries
In the final speech of Lamy at the Formal Trade Negotiations Committee meeting last July 22, 2013, he presented the package of issues for Least Developed Countries as the first element of the Bali Package. There are a number of issues in this area.
First, under Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), there are a number of issues: the 28 Cancun proposals, the Monitoring Mechanism and 6 agreement specific proposals. The 28 Cancun proposals were originally part of 88 proposals that were supposed to strengthen the S&DT provisions in the WTO. The 28 were actually already agreed before Cancun in 2003 but were not carried forward after the collapse of that Ministerial. Today, even though, as Lamy says, “These proposals enjoy an “in-principle” agreement,”[v] they are still being reviewed and a decision is yet to be taken on whether they would be adopted. The Monitoring Mechanism, which is also a long-standing demand of LDCs, that would monitor WTO rules vis a vis S&DT provisions, is still at the level of “conceptual clarity, but work still remains to translate this into drafting language.”[vi] Then the 6 agreement specific proposals, which have to do with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, have already been relegated to a post-Bali discussion.
Second, the 4 LDC issues: duty free quota free (DFQF) market access, rules of origin, cotton, and implementation of the LDCs services waiver. The DFQF market access issue was already agreed in the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial but never delivered.
Annex F: Special and Differential Treatment: LDC Agreement-specific Proposals: 36) Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries We agree that developed-country Members shall, and developing-country Members declaring themselves in a position to do so should: (a) (i) Provide duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis, for all products originating from all LDCs by 2008 or no later than the start of the implementation period in a manner that ensures stability, security and predictability.[vii]
Cotton is also an old issue, another long standing demand of LDCs, which was also already agreed in the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration and also yet to be delivered.
11) We recall the mandate given by the Members in the Decision adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 to address cotton ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically, within the agriculture negotiations in relation to all trade-distorting policies affecting the sector in all three pillars of market access, domestic support and export competition, as specified in the Doha text and the July 2004 Framework text…. – All forms of export subsidies for cotton will be eliminated by developed countries in 2006. – On market access, developed countries will give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from least-developed countries (LDCs) from the commencement of the implementation period.[viii]
Rules of origin, is again, also an old demand, which has to do with developed countries providing simplified and transparent rules of origin so as to facilitate market access for exports from LDCs.
The implementation of the LDCs services waiver is a demand to operationalize something that was already agreed. At the 2011 Ministerial of the WTO in Geneva, Ministers adopted a waiver to give preferential treatment to LDC service suppliers.
In reality, all the demands of the LDCs are long-standing demands, with several of them having already been agreed at previous Ministerials but just never delivered. And yet, in Lamy’s speech, he put the onus on LDCs, saying, “So, the LDC Bali package is in the making, but at this point, the ball is in the court of the LDCs. I hope the LDCs will be fully prepared to take forward their proposals after the summer break.”[ix]
The Bali Package is being presented as a way to move the developmental issues of the developing and LDCs such as issues on agriculture and special and differential treatment. However, the reality is that, developing countries and LDCs are giving developed countries an agreement on trade facilitation, something developed countries really want, to expand free trade into new areas and open the door to new negotiations, and in return, developing countries will get declarations and empty promises for things that were already in fact agreed and promised to them several years ago. The only new demand comes from the G33 but one can already see that developed countries will not agree to an amendment of the AoA and instead will offer half-measures and interim solutions, all of which, fall short of enabling developing countries from providing lasting food security to their smallholder and poor farmers.
The Return of the WTO means the Resurgence of the Free Trade Regime
In conclusion, the main reasons the 9th WTO Ministerial and the Bali Package are a threat to the people and the planet, are that it reinvigorates the WTO, revives the negotiations, opens the door to new negotiations into new areas and finally, fuels the resurgence of the free trade regime as a whole. The WTO has always been the centerpiece of the free trade regime with its multilateral reach and its special ability to legally enforce and penalize countries in order to implement global trade rules. The FTAs will also benefit from the revival of the WTO as all things agreed in the WTO can immediately be included in FTAs as FTAs are essentially WTO plus agreements.
It has been 18 years since the WTO was established. Since then, countless cases and evidence have been documented to show the negative impacts of free trade – small farmers and peasants losing their lands and livelihoods due to dumping and flooding of cheap imports, fishers displaced from their traditional fishing grounds, women bearing the brunt of the negative impacts on their communities, workers losing their jobs or forced to take on precarious work as companies compete to lower costs and families who are forced to migrate to look for work. Mother Nature is also a victim as free trade treats it as a thing to be exploited and commodified. The multiple crises of finance, food, climate, can all be linked to the free trade regime and how it has overexploited the planet, pushing us into this climate crisis, poisoning our food and speculating on prices driving them up beyond people’s reach and letting banks and transnational corporations run unregulated pushing us all into the brink of a global recession.
The G20 countries see more free trade, entering new areas in order to continue the rate of profit of their corporations, as the solution to the crisis. And the revival of the WTO is part of this plan. But if we are to hope for the future generations and the planet to have a future, we need to stop this now. There is not a moment to lose. There is no more time for half-measures, if we are to have a chance, we need to change the system now. What we need is not more free trade, but rather, a new system, one that is based on peoples’ sovereignty, economic, climate, social and cultural justice. What we need is a trade that is based on complementarity, solidarity and that has at its heart, the peoples’ interests and not that of corporations. We need an agricultural system that is based on food sovereignty and not based on growing cash crops for the markets. There are hundreds of alternatives from communities, from social movements, from peasants, workers, women, migrants, fishers, youth and economic justice activists. It is possible to have a world without the WTO, we just need to make it a reality.
It is time to end the WTO.
*Mary Louise Malig is staff for La Via Campesina-Asia. Malig is also a policy analyst and has written on the issues of trade particularly the World Trade Organization, the G-20 and also on issues of climate change and the green economy. She is co-author of the book, The Anti-Development State: The Political Economy of Permanent Crisis in the Philippines and a contributor to the volume on Southeast Asia of the seven volume series of SEI and UNEP, Civic Entrepreneurship: A Civil Society Perspective on Sustainable Development and author of a number of other papers.

[ii] Agriculture negotiations: Informal Meeting: Farm talks chair reports modest progress and calls for “an extremely focused” autumn. 18 July 2013
[iii] Bridges Weekly: “WTO: Ag Talks Chair Seeks to Reconcile Conflicting Visions for Bali” Volume 17, Issue 15, 2 May 2013
[iv] WT/MIN(05)/DEC 22 December 2005 Doha Work Programme Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18 December 2005
[v] Trade Negotiations Committee: Formal Meeting: Road to Bali much clearer than two months ago – Lamy. 22 July 2013
[vi] ibid
[vii] WT/MIN(05)/DEC 22 December 2005 Doha Work Programme Ministerial Declaration Adopted on 18 December 2005
[viii] ibid

[ix] Trade Negotiations Committee: Formal Meeting: Road to Bali much clearer than two months ago – Lamy. 22 July 2013


Introduce tus datos o haz clic en un icono para iniciar sesión:

Logo de

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Cerrar sesión /  Cambiar )

Google photo

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Google. Cerrar sesión /  Cambiar )

Imagen de Twitter

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Twitter. Cerrar sesión /  Cambiar )

Foto de Facebook

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Facebook. Cerrar sesión /  Cambiar )

Conectando a %s